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a  b  s  t  r a  c t
Interoception  refers to the  sensing of  internal  bodily changes. Interoception  interacts  with  cogni-
tion  and  emotion, making  measurement  of individual  differences  in  interoceptive  ability broadly
relevant to  neuropsychology.  However,  inconsistency  in how  interoception  is defined and  quanti-
fied led to a three-dimensional  model.  Here,  we provide  empirical  support  for  dissociation  between
dimensions  of: (1) interoceptive accuracy  (performance  on objective  behavioural tests of heartbeat detec-
tion),  (2) interoceptive sensibility  (self-evaluated assessment  of subjective interoception,  gauged  using
interviews/questionnaires)  and  (3)  interoceptive awareness  (metacognitive awareness of interoceptive
accuracy,  e.g.  confidence-accuracy  correspondence).  In  a normative  sample  (N  =  80), all three  dimensions
were  distinct  and  dissociable.  Interoceptive  accuracy  was only  partly  predicted  by interoceptive  aware-
ness and interoceptive  sensibility.  Significant  correspondence  between dimensions  emerged  only  within
the  sub-group of individuals  with  greatest  interoceptive  accuracy. These  findings  set the  context for
defining  how  the  relative balance  of accuracy,  sensibility  and  awareness  dimensions  explain  cognitive,
emotional  and  clinical  associations of  interoceptive  ability.
© 2014  The Authors.  Published by  Elsevier  B.V.  This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Interoception is the body-to-brain axis of sensation con-
cerning the state of the internal body and its visceral organs
(Cameron, 2001; Sherrington, 1948). Interoception is distinguish-
able from exteroception (perception of the external environment)
and proprioception (reflecting the position of the body in space)
(Sherrington, 1948). Some models expand the definition of
interoception to  accommodate other motivationally-important
physiological signals (e.g. pain, cutaneous light ‘sensual’ touch and
thermal sensations) (Craig, 2002). Interoceptive ability is relevant
to ‘peripheral’ theories of emotion that propose a basis for emo-
tional feeling states in the central representation and perception of
changes in bodily physiology (Lange & James, 1967). It follows that
individuals who are more attuned to bodily responses experience
emotions with heightened intensity (Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin,
2000). Renewed interest in  interoception parallels a  growing appre-
ciation that cognition is also embodied, and that cognitive and
∗ Corresponding author at: Clinical Imaging Science Centre, Brighton and Sussex
Medical School, University of Sussex, Falmer BN1 9RR, UK. Tel.: +44 01273 67 8584.
E-mail address: s.garfinkel@bsms.ac.uk (S.N. Garfinkel).
emotional processes are biased by extracerebral changes, captured
for example in the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, Tranel,
& Damasio, 1991). Correspondingly, neuroscientists, psychologists
and physiologists have focused efforts on characterizing how and
when internal bodily signals might guide cognition, with recent
work demonstrating that enhanced interoceptive accuracy can
improve memory (Garfinkel, Barrett, et al., 2013; Garfinkel, Tiley,
O’Keeffe, & Critchley, 2013; Werner, Peres, Duschek, & Schandry,
2010)  and decision making (Dunn, Galton, et al., 2010; Werner et al.,
2013).
Despite this historic and recent interest in interoception, the
literature to  date remains inconsistent in  the methods used to
assess interoceptive ability (Medford & Critchley, 2014). Firstly,
interoceptive accuracy (1) is  gauged via paradigms to objectively
quantify individual differences in behavioural performance. Heart-
beat detection tasks dominate these methods used to determine
individual differences in  interoceptive accuracy. This focus is
largely pragmatic: heartbeats are distinct and frequent internal
events that can be easily discriminated and measured. Heartbeat
detection procedures usually require either an individual to  count
the number of times they perceive their heart beating during
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.11.004
0301-0511/© 2014 The  Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC  BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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specified time periods (“Heartbeat Tracking” e.g. Schandry, 1981),
or instead to report the timing of individual heartbeats, through
tapping or through perceived synchrony of the heartbeats with
external stimuli (“Heartbeat Discrimination” e.g. Brener & Kluvitse,
1988; Katkin, Reed, & Deroo, 1983; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman,
& Blackwell, 1977). Measured interoceptive accuracy tends to be
greater when assessed using the heartbeat tracking task, relative
to heartbeat discrimination (Schulz, Lass-Hennemann, Sutterlin,
Schachinger, & Vogele, 2013), and the two methods likely involve
different processes, with the former dependent on internal mon-
itoring mechanisms, while the latter may  require simultaneous
multimodal integration of internal and external information.
Indeed, while some studies found these  two heartbeat detection
procedures to be correlated in  individuals (e.g. Hart, McGowan,
Minati, & Critchley, 2013; Knoll & Hodapp, 1992), this relationship
is not always tight, nor  observed in  small samples (e.g. Phillips,
Jones, Rieger, & Snell, 1999; Schulz et al., 2013). In addition, factors
such as stress (Schulz et al., 2013) differentially affect performance
on these two heartbeat discrimination and tracking procedures,
reinforcing the perspective that they are founded on distinct (as
well as potentially shared) underlying processes.
Secondly, an individual’s personal account of how they expe-
rience internal sensations represents an alternative mode of
interoception. This ‘sensibility’ (2) can be assessed using subjective
measures that index both the individual’s belief in their inter-
oceptive ability and the degree to which they feel engaged by
interoceptive signals (e.g. Ernst et al., 2013; Terasawa, Shibata,
Moriguchi, & Umeda, 2013; Wiebking et al., 2011). The quantifi-
cation of interoceptive sensibility can take two  forms. The first
approach is to use self-report questionnaires (e.g. Autonomic Per-
ception Questionnaire, Mandler, Mandler, & Uviller, 1958; Body
Perception Questionnaire, Porges, 1993), and the second approach
is to score subjective aspects (e.g. confidence in  interoceptive
accuracy) during the performance of a  specific interoceptive task.
Self-report questionnaire measures of interoception are useful in
measuring individual differences in perceived sensitivity across
a range of internal bodily changes but do not  inherently address
whether this subjective interoceptive sensibility is accurate (i.e.
actually relates to  the strength of viscerosensory ‘input’, or cor-
responds to objective measures of accuracy on interoceptive
tests). Indeed, self-report measures can reflect biases in subjective
thresholds, irrespective of interoceptive accuracy. Thus, a  strategy
adopted in some studies is  to combine measures of interoceptive
accuracy (e.g. heartbeat perception task performance), with a  mea-
sure of subjective confidence in  performing the task (Ehlers, Breuer,
Dohn, & Fiegenbaum, 1995). When averaged, the subjective confi-
dence score provides an index of interoceptive sensibility for that
particular axis of interoceptive signalling. These confidence meas-
ures can be combined with mean task accuracy (Khalsa et al., 2008)
to highlight the relationship between subjective (perceived) and
objective (actual) interoceptive ability. Importantly, more sophis-
ticated analytic approaches (e.g. receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves or trial-by-trial confidence – accuracy correlations)
can also be applied to  quantify explicitly how well confidence pre-
dicts accuracy within a  given individual. This third interoceptive
construct provides a measure of metacognitive awareness of intero-
ceptive ability, and therefore, by current standards (Barrett, Dienes,
& Seth, 2013), the most precise definition of interoceptive aware-
ness (3) (Garfinkel &  Critchley, 2013).
Previously, the terms ‘interoceptive awareness’ and ‘interocep-
tive sensitivity’ have been typically treated as synonymous and
interchangeable, without deep consideration as to whether the
mode of evaluation indeed assesses objective interoceptive accu-
racy, metacognitive awareness, or subjective sensibility, though
recently the term ‘interoceptive accuracy’ is  increasingly used
to refer to interoceptive behavioural performance (Ceunen, Van
Diest, &  Vlaeyen, 2013). To formalize these conceptual issues,
we recently proposed a  three dimensional construct of  intero-
ception that  distinguishes between these levels of interoceptive
processing (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). Here, the term interocep-
tive sensitivity, which we now unambiguously call interoceptive
accuracy,  is  used to define the process of accurately detecting and
tracking internal bodily sensations. This is  an objective empiri-
cal measure of behavioural performance, which is  distinct from
subjective measures. This objective-subjective distinction is  estab-
lished within human behavioural psychology (e.g. Cheesman &
Merikle, 1984, 1986; Dienes &  Berry, 1997; King & Dehaene, 2014;
Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008; Snodgrass
& Shevrin, 2006). The subjective, self-evaluated characterological
trait (from questionnaire measures) to be  interoceptively focused
is defined as interoceptive sensibility,  following prior literature
(Terasawa et al., 2013). Lastly, in the present manuscript we retain
the use of the term interoceptive awareness to refer to the correspon-
dence between objective interoceptive accuracy and subjective
report, i.e.  metacognition. Here, this is  implemented as a  quantified
measure of the degree to  which accuracy of (objective) heartbeat
detection is  predicted by subjective confidence in  the task judge-
ment, e.g. using area under an ROC curve (Barrett et al., 2013;
Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Galvin, Podd, Drga,
& Whitmore, 2003; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). A high level of
interoceptive awareness reflects the ability (i.e. meta-awareness)
of an individual to know when he/she is  making good or bad
interoceptive decisions, on the level of interoceptive behavioural
accuracy. These three distinct facets of interoception are depicted
in  Table 1.
The present paper responds to  a clear need to better differentiate
between objective, subjective and metacognitive aspects of  inte-
roception (Ceunen et al., 2013; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013), and
serves as the first experimental test of these distinctions within
a single study. Empirically, we determine the extent to which
interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive sensibility and interoceptive
awareness interrelate across a large normative sample of healthy
individuals. We  focus on heartbeat discrimination and tracking,
which provide two objective tests of interoceptive accuracy. We
establish empirically the extent of interoceptive awareness across
the sample, and further test the hypothesis that these awareness
levels are  different between individuals who score high or low
on interoceptive accuracy. We also formally characterize the rela-
tionships between interoceptive accuracy, sensibility and awareness
using a stepwise linear regression analysis that  incorporates a  for-
ward selection procedure to  test the hypothesis that explanatory
variance will be partitioned between the different interoceptive
dimensions, as predicted by our model. We  extend this regression
approach to test our prediction that interoceptive accuracy is the
basic construct underlying other aspects of interoception (Garfinkel
& Critchley, 2013), predicting that we will formally show depend-
ence of sensibility and awareness on interoceptive accuracy (and
a corresponding weakening of relationships if interoceptive sen-
sibility or interoceptive awareness are considered as dependent
variables).
We use correlational analyses to detail whether the three
dimensions of interoception show different relationships depend-
ing on the task used to measure interoceptive accuracy (heartbeat
tracking vs. heartbeat discrimination). Lastly, we test whether dis-
tinct relationships emerge in individuals classified as high or low
on interoceptive accuracy. This extends the notion of a  primacy of
interoceptive accuracy to suggest that relationships between the
three different dimensions of interoception may  emerge only when
an objective accuracy threshold is surpassed. Thus, individuals sco-
ring high (compared to low) on interoceptive accuracy would show
significantly stronger correspondence across objective, subjective
and metacognitive interoceptive dimensions.
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Table 1
Three distinct dimensions of interoception, as initially proposed by  Garfinkel and Critchley (2013), and further refined in the present manuscript.
Interoceptive accuracy Interoceptive sensibility Interoceptive awareness
Definition Objective accuracy in detecting
internal bodily sensations
Self-perceived dispositional tendency
to be internally self-focused and
interoceptively cognisant
Metacognitive awareness of
interoceptive accuracy
Example Can you accurately report when your
heart is  beating?
To what extent do you believe you
focus  on  and detect internal bodily
sensations?
Do you “know” whether you are
accurately or inaccurately assessing
your heart-timing?
Mode  of assessment Assessed via objective tests of
interoceptive accuracy
Assessed via subjective self-report
measures probing perceived aptitude
Relationship between objective
performance (interoceptive accuracy)
and awareness of performance
Example Behavioural performance accuracy
during heartbeat detection/mental
tracking tasks
Questionnaires, such as Porges Body
Perception Questionnaire, or global
self-report measures such  as average
confidence
Area under ROC curves mapping
confidence onto accuracy
1. Method
1.1. Participants
Healthy volunteer participants were recruited from staff and
students of the University of Sussex, and Brighton and Sussex
Medical School. Eighty participants took part in all experimental
procedures. Demographic data were collected for sex, age and body
mass index. Each participant provided written informed consent,
with all procedures approved by  the local ethics committee at the
Brighton and Sussex Medical School.
1.2. Materials and procedure
1.2.1. Interoceptive accuracy
Two measures determined objective interoceptive accuracy: a
heartbeat discrimination task (e.g.  Katkin et al., 1983) and a  heart-
beat tracking task (Schandry, 1981).
Heartbeat discrimination tasks typically involve the presenta-
tion of a periodic external stimulus (e.g. tones, lights); participants
state whether this external stimulus is synchronous or asyn-
chronous with their own heart. Our heartbeat discrimination task
required the participant to  judge whether a  series of ten auditory
tones were synchronous with his/her heartbeat; this procedure was
repeated 15 times to  form 15 trials. Each participant was provided
with the following instructions: ‘You will hear ten tones. Please can
you tell me  if the tones are in or out of sync with your heartbeat’. Each
trial consisted of 10 tones presented at 440 Hz and having 100 ms
duration, triggered by  the participant’s heartbeat. Under the syn-
chronous condition, tones were generated at the beginning of the
rising edge of the pulse pressure wave. Under the asynchronous
condition, a delay of 300 ms  was inserted, adjusting for the aver-
age delay (∼250 ms)  between the R-wave and the arrival of the
pressure wave at the finger (Payne, Symeonides, Webb, & Maxwell,
2006). This setup delivered tones around 250 ms  or 550 ms after
the  R-wave, which correspond to  maximum and minimum syn-
chronicity judgements respectively (Wiens & Palmer, 2001). At  the
end of each trial, the participants responded by stating whether
the series of tones were either synchronous or  asynchronous with
her/his heartbeats. In both conditions, the tones were presented at
the same rate (i.e. either on the heartbeat or time-shifted), hence
participants could not use the tempo of tones or other knowledge
about their heart rate to guide responses: phase synchrony of tones
and heartbeats served as the only informative cue.
In the heartbeat tracking task, participants were given the fol-
lowing instructions: ‘Without manually checking, can you silently
count each heartbeat you feel in your body from the time you hear
“start” to when you hear “stop”’. This task was repeated six times
to form six trials, using time-windows of 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and
50 s,  presented in randomized order. For each trial, an accuracy
score was  derived: 1 − (|nbeatsreal− nbeatsreported|)/((nbeatsreal +
nbeatsreported)/2): Resulting accuracy scores were averaged over
the 6 trials, yielding an average value for each participant (Hart
et al., 2013). The inclusion of reported values (nbeatsreported) within
the denominator mitigated against overestimating performance
accuracy in people showing high variance, particularly when more
heartbeats were reported than occurred.
1.2.2. Confidence judgments
At the end of each trial (N =  15 for heartbeat discrimination and
N = 6  for heartbeat tracking), the participant immediately rated
his/her confidence in their perceived accuracy of response. This
confidence judgement was  made using paper/pencil marked on a
continuous visual analogue scale (VAS) that was 10 cm long. One
end was  marked “Total guess/No heartbeat awareness” while the
other end was  labelled “Complete confidence/Full perception of
heartbeat”.
1.2.3. Interoceptive sensibility
The awareness section of the Porges Body Perception Question-
naire was completed (Porges, 1993). This subscale incorporates 45
bodily sensations (e.g. stomach and gut pains) and participants
indicated their awareness of each sensation using a  five point scale
ranging from ‘never’ to ‘always’. In addition, a  measure of  interocep-
tive sensibility pertaining just to  self-perceived heartbeat detection
was also derived from the mean confidence during both heart-
beat discrimination and heartbeat tracking tasks (i.e. averaged over
experimental trials to produce a  global measure of mean confi-
dence). Thus two measures of interoceptive sensibility were used;
one relating to a spectrum of internal bodily sensations (Porges
Body Perception Questionnaire) and one pertaining just to the heart
(mean confidence ratings).
1.3. Data analysis
1.3.1. Interoceptive awareness
Interoceptive awareness during the heartbeat discrimination
task was  quantified using receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve analysis (Green & Swets, 1966) of the extent to  which con-
fidence predicted accuracy. ROC analysis determines the strength
with which a  binary response (here confidence measured by  VAS)
mirrors a  binary state variable (here correct or incorrect asynchrony
judgement during heartbeat discrimination) at all possible detec-
tion thresholds. For each detection threshold, one computes the
hit rate (here the proportion of correct trials on which confidence
was ‘high’) and the false alarm rate (here the proportion of incor-
rect trials on which confidence was  ‘high’). The ROC curve plots
the hit rate vs. the false alarm rate over all the possible detection
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thresholds. The area under the ROC curve gives a precise measure
of the extent to which confidence reflects accuracy, independent
of the participant’s overall propensity to report high confidence.
Thus this provides a  measure specifically of interoceptive aware-
ness. For the heartbeat tracking task, on which responses were not
binary, the within-participant Pearson correlation, r, between con-
fidence and accuracy provided an alternative index of interoceptive
awareness.
We undertook a  median split of participants to investigate
whether individuals distinguished by high and low interoceptive
accuracy differed in  their sensibility and awareness measures of
interoception. When indexing by  heartbeat tracking, high accu-
racy heartbeat trackers were those with an accuracy score of
0.70 and above (N =  40, mean =  0.83, Std. =  0.08), while low accu-
racy trackers had an accuracy score of 0.69 or below (N  =  40,
mean = 0.49, Std. = 0.16), values comparable to previous median
split analyses (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011). For
heartbeat discrimination, determining group membership via a
median split resulted in fewer subjects classified as high-accuracy
heartbeat detectors, with an accuracy score of 0.65 and above
(N = 30, mean = 0.79, Std. =  0.11). Low-accuracy detectors had an
accuracy score of 0.60 and below (N =  50, mean = 0.48, Std. =  0.11).
1.3.2. Statistical analyses
To determine the relative presence or absence of interoceptive
awareness (i.e. metacognition) at the group level (i.e. collapsed
across all participants), one-sample t-tests were used to  establish
whether confidence-accuracy correlations differed significantly
from zero, and whether the area under the confidence-by-accuracy
ROC curve differed significantly from 0.5 (chance) performance.
This latter analysis was also performed separately in individuals
with high and low interoceptive accuracy. Independent t-tests
assessed whether interoceptive awareness and sensibility were
higher in individuals who  performed high on interoceptive accu-
racy relative to low performers, testing our hypothesis that the
strongest relationships between subjective and metacognitive
interoceptive dimensions would emerge in individuals with great-
est (objective) interoceptive accuracy.
A stepwise forward linear regression analysis was conducted
across all measures, collapsed across the two tasks, to exam-
ine our specific prediction that interoceptive accuracy would
partly, perhaps independently, relate to subjective sensibility and
metacognitive awareness dimensions. Firstly, the analysis was con-
ducted with interoceptive accuracy as the dependent variable, with
measures of interoceptive sensibility (BPQ and mean heartbeat task
confidence) and interoceptive awareness, as predictor variables.
Secondly, this regression analysis was repeated using interoceptive
awareness as the dependent variable; our hypothesis that intero-
ceptive accuracy serves as the base (central) construct predicted
that, in this analysis, the statistical relationship between the three
interoceptive measures would be greatly diminished.
Pearson’s correlations were also employed to explore relation-
ships between all objective, subjective and awareness measures
of interoception, independently for the two objective tests, and
separately in individuals classified as high and low on  inter-
oceptive accuracy. Adjusted thresholds for rejecting the null
hypothesis were computed separately for the two clusters of
Pearson’s correlational analyses, using false discovery rate (FDR)
implemented in Matlab 2012a. For the first cluster of correla-
tional analyses, which collapsed across heartbeat tracking and
discrimination tasks, the FDR corrected p-values were adjusted
to reflect the ten key correlations of interest which either (a)
compared the same interoceptive dimension across the two
heartbeat detection tasks (e.g. interoceptive accuracy during
heartbeat tracking vs. heartbeat discrimination), or (b) com-
pared distinct axes of interoception within the same task (e.g.
interoceptive accuracy during heartbeat discrimination vs.  inter-
oceptive awareness during heartbeat discrimination). Analyses in
which variables and/or task were not aligned (e.g. interoceptive
accuracy during heartbeat tracking with interoceptive awareness
during heartbeat discrimination) were excluded. For completeness,
the full matrix of these correlational analyses is included in Table 2.
FDR was  also used to adjust p-values for multiple comparisons for
the 12 Pearson’s correlational analyses conducted separately for
tasks and median-split (high/low in  interoceptive accuracy) groups.
Throughout the paper, FDR adjusted p-values were used to protect
against spurious Type-1 errors and guide interpretation of  results.
Unadjusted p-values are also included in  order to provide the reader
which a  comprehensive set of values that can inform future hypoth-
esis testing.
2.  Results
2.1. Demographic data
In  the total sample of N =  80,  50 were males (62.5%) and 30
were females (37.5%). Age was  recorded for N =  76 participants
[mean =  25.1 years, Std. =  4.44]. A subset of representative partici-
pants (N =  24) also provided body mass index [mean =  22.14 kg  m−2,
Std. =  3.04]. These age and BMI  values approximate to those
from other healthy samples in published studies of interoception
(Pollatos, Gramann, & Schandry, 2007).
2.2. Interoceptive accuracy
The group as a  whole performed above chance for objective
performance accuracy, as assessed with heartbeat discrimination
[t(79) =  4.  80, p <  0.001] and with heartbeat tracking [mean = 0.66
Std. =  0.21]. We  noted a  considerable inter-individual variation
in  interoceptive accuracy (for both tasks), that enabled us to
meaningfully explore associations with measures of interoceptive
awareness (Fig. 1a) and interoceptive sensibility (Fig. 1b).
2.3. Interoceptive awareness
Metacognitive interoceptive awareness, derived from
confidence–accuracy correlations (i.e. Pearson’s r) during heartbeat
tracking, significantly differed from zero at  the overall group level
[t(79) =  5.03, p  <  0.001, p-FDR = 0.006]. There was no significant
difference in interoceptive awareness between individuals rated
high and low on interoceptive accuracy during heartbeat tracking
[t(78) =  −1.28, p  =  0.21]. In contrast, interoceptive awareness,
measured using ROC curve analysis of heartbeat discrimina-
tion task data, did not reach above-chance significance across
the whole group [t(79) = 1.61, p  =  0.11]. However, interoceptive
awareness for good heart-beat discriminators did differ from
chance [t(29) =  2.30, p  =  0.029, p-FDR =  0.087], whereas poor heart
beat discriminators demonstrated no significant interoceptive
awareness [t(49) =  −0.04, p =  0.97].
2.4. Determining the relationships between different measures of
interoception
2.4.1. Regression analyses
Individual differences in mean interoceptive awareness were
significantly related to  interoceptive accuracy score across all
participants (dependent variable: mean accuracy collapsed
across the two  objective heartbeat perception tasks) [t = 3.31,
 ˇ = 0.35, p  =  0.001]. Interoceptive sensibility (measured by  average
confidence, and included in  step two of the stepwise regression
analysis), also predicted mean accuracy [t = 2.15,  ˇ =  0.22, p  =  0.035],
independently of mean interoceptive awareness [t = 3.30, ˇ  = 0.34,
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Table  2
Correlation matrix to  demonstrate the relationships between the  three distinct facets of interoception during heartbeat tracking and heartbeat discrimination.
In  each cell, the first number corresonds to the r value, and the second number denotes the p  value.
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tracking
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heartbe at 
tracking (R)
Mean 
confidence 
heartbe at 
tracking
Heartb eat 
dis criminati on
Awarene ss 
heartbe at 
disc rimination 
(ROC)
Mean confidence 
heartbe at 
discrimination 
Awa reness 
portion of BPQ
Heartbeat  tracking 1
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p = 0.001]. The questionnaire measure of general interoceptive sen-
sibility, assessed using the BPQ, was rejected from both  regression
models [t = 1.09, ˇ  = 0.12, p = 0.23; t =  0.81,  ˇ =  0.09, p  =  0.42]. Thus,
self-rated sensibility across a range of internal bodily sensations
did not independently predict objective measures of interoceptive
accuracy on either task, beyond what was also accounted for
by interoceptive awareness and heartbeat-specific interoceptive
sensibility. Interoceptive accuracy was  thus significantly and
independently associated with both interoceptive awareness
and axis-specific interoceptive sensibility, but not by  a more
general measure of interoceptive sensibility. As a  control, when
the regression model was changed so that interoceptive awareness
was entered as the dependent variable, it was still predicted by
interoceptive accuracy, but not by the general (questionnaire;
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Fig. 1. Correlation between two objective measures of interoceptive accuracy, determined using heartbeat tracking (silent counting of heartbeats in specified time windows)
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sensitivity, derived separately from these two tasks, were also significantly interrelated (B).
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Fig. 2. A correlation between objective interoceptive accuracy and mean confidence was only present in individuals with high interoceptive accuracy during both the
heartbeat tracking and heartbeat discrimination tasks. In addition, interoceptive awareness (metacognition) only correlated with heartbeat tracking in the high interoceptive
accuracy group. Together, these findings support the hypothesis that relationships between the distinct dimensions of interoceptive awareness are  more likely to manifest
amongst individuals with high interoceptive accuracy.
t = −1.45,  ˇ = −0.15, p  =  0.15) or specific scores of interoceptive
sensibility (heartbeat confidence, t =  −0.411, ˇ  = −0.045, p = 0.68).
2.4.2. Correlational analyses
The two objective tests of interoceptive accuracy, heartbeat dis-
crimination and heartbeat tracking, were significantly correlated
[r = 0.317, p = 0.004, p-FDR = 0.02] (see Fig. 1A). The two measures
of mean confidence were also highly correlated [r  =  0.711, p  <  0.001,
p-FDR = 0.01] (see Fig. 1B). Interestingly, the two interoceptive
awareness measures (derived from confidence-accuracy correla-
tions and area under ROC curve) were not significantly related.
The relationships between our other measures of interoception
were much weaker and principally subthreshold significance when
the two interoceptive tasks were analyzed separately (see Table 2
for a correlation matrix).
2.4.3. Median split analyses
2.4.3.1. Heartbeat tracking. Among the high accuracy heartbeat
trackers, mean confidence correlated with objective interoceptive
accuracy (r = 0.43, p  =  0.006, p-FDR =  0.036) (Fig. 2A).  Within the low
accuracy group, we observed no significant correlation between
this subjective measure of task-specific sensibility and objective
interoceptive accuracy (r =  −0.13, p  =  0.42) (Fig. 2B). Thus, mean
confidence successfully predicted mean interoceptive accuracy
only in  those individuals who  objectively showed high interocep-
tive accuracy. This was also expressed in  interoceptive awareness,
which was  significantly related to interoceptive accuracy only in
the high interoceptive accuracy group [r = 0.33, p  =  0.038] (Fig. 2A).
General interoceptive sensibility (BPQ) approached significance
(r = 0.28, p =  0.078) across these individuals. Interestingly, no intero-
ceptive sensibility or awareness measure correlated with objective
heartbeat tracking performance in  low accuracy heartbeat trackers
(r < 0.5, p >  0.4).
2.4.3.2. Heartbeat discrimination. Similar effects were observed
for heartbeat discrimination: Among high accuracy heartbeat
discriminators, mean confidence was significantly correlated
with heartbeat discrimination performance (r =  0.56, p = 0.001, p-
FDR =  0.012) (Fig. 2C). However, there was no significant correlation
with the other measure of interoceptive sensibility, nor with inter-
oceptive awareness. In the low heartbeat discrimination group,
heartbeat discrimination performance did not  correlate with any
measure (r <  −0.12, p >  0.40) (Fig. 2D).
3. Discussion
Our study was motivated by conceptual and methodologi-
cal variability within the study of interoception. Previous studies
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frequently conflate distinct aspects of interoception, namely objec-
tive behavioural performance on interoceptive tasks, trait-based
self-reported belief about interoceptive aptitude (i.e. interocep-
tive sensibility), and interoceptive awareness. The frameworks
for  understanding interoception and its interaction with cogni-
tive and emotional processes are becoming more refined (e.g.
Craig, 2004; Critchley, Eccles, & Garfinkel, 2013; Podsiadlo et al.,
2009; Seth, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). These motivate
a need for well specified and differentiated empirical measures
of interoceptive performance. We  therefore used two  heartbeat-
dependent objective tests of interoceptive accuracy alongside
subjective confidence judgements of performance and a self-
reported questionnaire rating, to examine the interrelatedness of
objective, subjective and awareness measures of interoception.
Our first main observation was that interoceptive accuracy was
related to both interoceptive awareness and subjective intero-
ception, as assessed via mean confidence during the heartbeat
detection tasks. It is  noteworthy that interoceptive awareness was
independent of (i.e. did not predict) interoceptive sensibility. This
endorses the notion that interoceptive accuracy is the central con-
struct underpinning other interoceptive measures. Our second key
observation, in  many ways a test of construct validity, was that
performance accuracy on the (objective) heartbeat discrimination
and (objective) heartbeat tracking tasks were correlated, as were
the two mean confidence ratings. However, it is interesting to  note
that the measures of interoceptive awareness derived from each
of the two tasks were not correlated, highlighting differences in
conscious monitoring of interoceptive performance that may  orig-
inate in distinct demand characteristics intrinsic to  these tasks. This
observation has implications for future studies measuring intero-
ceptive ability.
Across this non-clinical sample of young adults, our data also
support distinctions between actual interoceptive accuracy, sub-
jective interoceptive sensibility (mean confidence pertaining to
heart and Porges Body Perception Questionnaire) and metacogni-
tive interoceptive awareness of performance. By illustrating this
potential for independence, our empirical findings are consistent
with our proposed model that  defined three distinct dissociable
dimensions of interoception (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013). Impor-
tantly, we observed relationships between these dimensions only
in people with high interoceptive accuracy, for whom mean confi-
dence and interoceptive awareness were related to performance of
the heartbeat tracking task. This is consistent with our hypothesis
regarding the primacy of accurate interoception, such that  a cor-
respondence between the dimensions would emerge only after a
basic accuracy threshold is  overcome, which is more likely for indi-
viduals showing high objective measures of interoceptive accuracy.
Similarly, for  the heartbeat discrimination task (which produced
lower measures of accuracy than the tracking task), the correlation
between confidence and accuracy was apparent in  the high inter-
oceptive group only, but not across the whole sample, which again
accorded with our specific prediction that relationships between
different dimensions of interoception are stronger in  individuals
with high interoceptive accuracy.
Mental processes can be  dissected in terms of the relationship
between observed behaviour and awareness. Behaviour and aware-
ness may  closely correlate or markedly diverge, often depending on
context, as seen in  the examples of emotion (Lane, 2008), knowl-
edge and perception (Dienes & Perner, 1999; Seth et al., 2008). This
distinction is also reflected across brain networks, wherein distinct
patterns of functional brain connectivity correlate with objective
performance and subjective beliefs (Barttfeld et al., 2013). With
respect to interoception, we hypothesize a similar dissociation
of neural substrates encoding discrete bodily changes, including
individual heartbeats, putatively in regions such as right anterior
insula (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004), and
those underlying the perception, interpretation, and use of such
information in  the context of other cognitive, motivational, and
affective processes, potentially anterior cingulate cortex (Medford
& Critchley, 2014) and orbitofrontal areas (Fleming, 2012; Kepecs,
Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008). Cameron (2001) suggests that
the concurrent engagement of central arousal mediated by  the
reticular system is a  likely basis for why  only a  relatively reduced
amount of interoceptive information reaches conscious awareness.
Stimulation of the reticular formation can facilitate conduction of
exteroceptive and proprioceptive information to  the cortex, yet
might inhibit interoceptive information flow (Cameron, 2001). It
has been previously noted that self-reported heartbeat aware-
ness (using questionnaires) tend not to be  strongly correlated
with actual (experimentally measured) heartbeat awareness (e.g.
Mcfarland, 1975; Whitehead et al., 1977),  such that a  preoccupation
with internal bodily sensations and a  belief in one’s own  intero-
ceptive accuracy does not necessary predict actual interoceptive
ability. Deviations between subjective (arguably a more cortical)
questionnaire ratings of interoceptive sensibility and interoceptive
accuracy are also reported in clinical populations (Garfinkel, Tiley,
et al., 2013). We reinforce and extend these observations by sys-
tematically dissociating the three dimensions of interoception, and
characterizing interoceptive awareness and sensibility in relation
to  task demand and individual differences in accuracy.
Objective interoceptive accuracy in  heartbeat detection does not
appear to be  enhanced with training in body awareness (though see
Schaefer, Egloff, Gerlach, & Witthoft, 2014). Experienced meditators
do not  differ from non-meditators in heartbeat detection accu-
racy, yet consistently rate their performance accuracy to be higher
(Khalsa et al., 2008). Thus, meditative experience increases a  trait
measure of confidence in interoceptive ability, which in turn (as
much due to under-confidence in non-meditators) increases mea-
sured awareness through better correspondence between overall
perceived performance accuracy with actual performance (Khalsa
et al., 2008). Dissociation between the effects of interoceptive accu-
racy and awareness is  also apparent from interventional studies
designed to enhance selectively one dimension of interoception:
Heartbeat feedback training, a  manipulation to enhance intero-
ceptive awareness, can change the style of decision-making (when
people performed the ‘ultimatum game’) yet at the same time, indi-
vidual differences in  interoceptive accuracy do not  affect overall
outcome (Lenggenhager, Azevedo, Mancini, & Aglioti, 2013).
While we observed significant relationships between intero-
ceptive accuracy, sensibility and awareness when we collapsed
data across heartbeat tracking and discrimination tasks, significant
correlations were largely absent when analyses were performed
separately for each of the tasks. Thus, the process of increasing sta-
tistical power across the group and diluting variance intrinsic to
the separate interoceptive tests seems to drill into a fundamental
property (putatively representational accuracy) shared across the
three dimensions of interoception. The power to detect an effect is
also influenced by the number of trials. While our experiment was
sufficiently powered to determine interoceptive accuracy, it may
have had less than ideal sensitivity for the assessment of metacog-
nition measures (published experiments assessing metacognitive
ability typically involve more trials per participant; Green & Swets,
1966; Howard, Bessette-Symons, Zhang, & Hoyer, 2006). Future
research should ensure adequate power to determine all objective,
subjective/sensibility and awareness measures of interoception,
and potentially test even larger samples to  identify discrete sub-
groups of participants. For example, those individuals displaying
heightened interoceptive ability across all interoceptive dimen-
sions might be more appropriately compared to participants who
show selective deficits, e.g. reduced metacognitive awareness of
interoception in  the presence of intact interoceptive accuracy.
Our median split analysis revealed much stronger correspondence
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between interoceptive accuracy and confidence/awareness in a
subset of highly interoceptively accurate individuals. Our proposal
is that this is due to a threshold effect in interoceptive accuracy
(i.e. a minimal level of basic representational fidelity is  required).
This view is also supported by another recent study in which we
found that objective measures of body ownership, assessed in a
virtual-reality ‘rubber hand illusion’ paradigm, were modulated
by individual interoceptive accuracy only for those participants
with high accuracy, again as determined by a  median split (Suzuki,
Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013).
There is presently limited information about the extent to
which interoception concords across different bodily axes. Heart-
beat tracking and discrimination tests are assumed to map  onto
other measures of interoceptive accuracy, for example as evidenced
by correlations between performance during heartbeat and gas-
tric detection tasks (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 2012;
Whitehead & Drescher, 1980). This is  in line with recent work which
demonstrates a link between interoceptive accuracy and ‘intuitive
eating’, an adaptive measure presumed to reflect an individual’s
capacity to be guided by sensations of hunger and fullness (Herbert,
Blechert, Hautzinger, Matthias, & Herbert, 2013). Certainly, more
research is needed to  determine the robustness of these relation-
ships (e.g. Whitehead & Drescher, 1980 reported a  correlation of
r = 0.51, N = 20) and to  establish the degree to  which performance
on heartbeat detection tests extrapolates to  other modalities such
as respiration. There is therefore a  need for future studies to char-
acterize and compare distinct types of interoceptive accuracy (e.g.
respiratory, gastric) alongside heartbeat signals, including both
sensibility and awareness measures. This knowledge will enrich
our understanding of relationships between accuracy and aware-
ness across a range of visceral bodily signals and have broader
clinical relevance. We  note also that the correspondence between
objective interoceptive performance measures and self-perceived
interoception is influenced by  the mode of assessment, includ-
ing choice of questionnaire to assess interoceptive sensibility and
objective interoceptive tasks to assess accuracy. Here, our measures
of mean interoceptive confidence pertain just to heartbeat signals,
thus mirroring measures of interoceptive accuracy and interocep-
tive awareness. This shared focus on the heart likely accounts for
why this subjective sensibility measure yielded closer correspon-
dence to interoceptive accuracy and awareness, when compared
to  the questionnaire measure of general interoceptive sensibil-
ity across different bodily sensations. Also, in  the present study,
we assessed this more general interoceptive sensibility using the
awareness portion of the Body Perception Questionnaire (Porges,
1993). Our finding that this sensibility measure did not positively
relate to objectively determined interoceptive accuracy replicates
previous research (Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007; Schulz et al., 2013).
It remains to be established if other questionnaire measures, such
as the Autonomic Perception Questionnaire (Mandler et al., 1958)
and Body Awareness Questionnaire (Shields, Mallory, &  Simon,
1989), yield closer correspondence to  accuracy measures in heart-
beat tasks (or tests of other interoceptive axes, e.g. respiratory
or gastric cues). Further investigation could help  elucidate the
extent to which lack of correspondence between interoceptive sen-
sibility and interoceptive accuracy is influenced by  the particular
methodology used, or reflects an underlying divergence of these
two interoceptive constructs.
Our dimensional model provides the foundation and impetus
to quantify objective indices of interoceptive performance accu-
racy against subjective questionnaire measures of interoceptive
sensibility, an important development especially given the poten-
tial clinical significance of discrepancy between these objective
and subjective dimensions. It  has been suggested that  individuals
who are prone to anxiety show an altered interoceptive predic-
tion signal, through which they manifest a  heightened discrepancy
between observed and expected bodily states (Paulus & Stein, 2006,
2010). Enhanced interoceptive processing has been documented
among individuals with anxiety (Dunn, Stefanovitch, et al., 2010;
Pollatos, Traut-Mattausch, Schroeder, & Schandry, 2007; Terasawa
et al., 2013), yet this finding has not always been demonstrated
(Asmundson, Sandler, Wilson, & Norton, 1993; Craske, Lang, Tsao,
Mystkowski, & Rowe, 2001), and may  not extrapolate to interocep-
tive tests using respiration (Bogaerts et al., 2005; van den Bergh
et al., 2004). While anxiety patients can manifest a  more accu-
rate perception of their interoceptive performance than controls,
external factors are more likely to disrupt the extent to  which
their subjective confidence corresponds with their interoceptive
accuracy (Ehlers et al., 1995). An  altered interoceptive prediction
error signal might derive from discrepancy between the represen-
tation of bodily signals and the subjective awareness and evaluation
of these signals. Interoceptive error signals may further depend
upon representational precision and accuracy of the expected inter-
nal state of the body (Seth, 2013; Seth & Critchley, 2013; Seth
et al., 2011). These arguments, alongside the present data, further
substantiate an emerging theoretical framework of ‘interoceptive
predictive coding’ or  ‘interoceptive inference’ (Gu, Hof, Friston,
& Fan, 2013; Seth, 2013; Seth et al., 2011). Here, Bayesian prin-
ciples of predictive processing (e.g. Clark, 2013) are extended
to  interoception, such that subjective feeling states (emotions)
are  proposed to arise from hierarchically-organized probabilistic
inference of the causes of interoceptive signals. Importantly, this
implies multiple levels of representation of interoceptive sensa-
tion and perception which have previously been experimentally
and theoretically opaque. The present data from a normative
healthy population, and our multidimensional model for interocep-
tion, represent important steps towards formalizing this proposed
layering of representations underlying interoceptive judgement,
plausibly reflecting multiple sources of interoceptive predictions
and their independence from veridical interoceptive signals.
Future work should build on integrating these multidimensional
theoretical models of interoception and interoceptive predictive
coding towards better characterizing the differential contributions
of levels of interoceptive representation to  clinical psychologi-
cal and psychosomatic conditions. More generally, an enhanced
neurobiological understanding of the underlying neural substrates
and interactions will help construct a  comprehensive and nuanced
understanding of the wider contributions of bodily representation
to  emotion, cognition, and consciousness.
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